This paper describes how malicious customers can attack the availability of Content Centric Networks (CCNs) by creating forwarding loops. These loops cause one request to be processed repeatedly or even indefinitely, resulting in unwanted resource consumption and potential Denial-of-Service attacks. Next, we propose detection and mitigation techniques that will allow routers to identify and prevent the formation of such loops. To evaluate the practicality of such forwarding-loop attacks, we use the popular CCN simulation software, ndnSIM to simulate the occurrences of the loops and show how they can affect the overall service of the network.
INTRODUCTION
Today the Internet is mainly used for data dissemination to interested users, rather than for connecting hosts. The user is interested in data itself, while the location of data is of minor importance. However, the Internet was formerly designed and has evolved according to the host- In this way all the intermediate nodes are engaged in satisfying the requests from the attacker, indeterminably sustaining the loop.
Thesis Contributions
In this thesis we firstly define Content Centric Networking and its core principles and strategies We also discuss its implementation in Mobile Networks. Previous related work on the security issues and attacks in CCN are surveyed. We then present the forwarding loop attacks in CCN and discuss the three stages of its implementation in static, mobile-ad hoc and mobileinfrastructure networks. Later we describe a few strategies to mitigate these attacks. Finally, we use ndnSIM software tool to simulate and examine the impact of these looping attacks in single and multiple compromised node networks.
Thesis Organization
The rest of this paper as follows. Chapter 2 describes CCN operation, especially forwarding and flooding techniques. In Chapter 3, the security issues and related attacks in CCN are studied.
Chapter 4 presents various forwarding loop attacks and discuss possible defenses to prevent or mitigate them. In Chapter 5 the aforementioned loop attacks are simulated using the ndnSIM software tool. We conclude in Chapter 6.
Introduction
In 
Forwarding Strategy in CCN
We next describe the sequence of actions that are taken in order by CCN nodes when they receive an Interest or Content object.
CASE 1: When an Interest Packet P with content name N is received on face F
• Check for duplicate Interest packets:
----If there are recently seen Interests with the same name or P has reached its hop-limit, then P is discarded
• Check for existing data:
----If there is a Content Object in the CS whose name exactly matches N then send that Content object as a reply, and P is discarded
• Check for duplicate Interests waiting for replies:
----Else if N exactly matches the name in an entry of the PIT then F is added to the face list for that entry and P is discarded 
Flooding Strategy and other concepts (a) Arrival of New Interest
At the initial stage, the FIB on each CCN node is empty. An incoming Interest packet at Face 0 is propagated to all Faces (1, 2, and 3) except the incoming Face 0. This is initial flooding.
(b) Arrival of the First Data Packet
When the first Data packet arrives, the corresponding FIB entry is created. The prefix of the Data name is stored in the Prefix field and the arrival face of the Data is recorded in the Face(s) field, which can maintain N maximum elements (faces).
Figure 3. Flooding Strategy in CCN (c) Arrival of Data Packet with the Same Prefix
When there is the second Data packet with the same prefix as an existing packet in the FIB, the arrival face will be added to the corresponding Face(s). If N faces are already stored in the set of Face(s), a FIFO operation is performed. That means that the first oldest arrival face will be deleted.
(d) Interest Forwarding Principle
As described in the previous section, when a new Interest packet arrives that matches Prefix entries in the FIB, Interest forwarding is performed by selecting one face among the elements in Face(s) according to the occurrence ratio of the faces. That is, the most successful face is selected.
Since the FIB can maintain at most N faces, the learning mechanism adjusts the face selection according to the recent data retrievals. In the case of link failure or packet loss, data does not return in time; therefore, the data requester or consumer returns to step [a] , flooding the Interest to all available connected faces to discover a working path quickly.
Lifetime Strategy CASE 1: If a new, similar, Interest comes from the same previous hop then:
• If the new Lifetime would extend PIT entry lifetime, update the PIT entry to the max of (old Lifetime, new Lifetime) and forward.
• if the new Lifetime would not extend PIT entry, forward (no PIT update required).
CASE 2:
If a new, similar, Interest comes from a different previous hop then:
• If the new Lifetime would not extend the PIT entry, update PIT with new previous hop and don't forward.
• If the new Lifetime would extend the PIT entry, update PIT entry to the max of (old Lifetime, new Lifetime), add the new previous hop, and forward.
Loop suppression in CCN
CCN inherently supports multipath routing. IP routing adopts a single best path to prevent loops. In CCN, Interests cannot loop persistently, since the name plus a random nonce can effectively identify duplicates to discard. Data do not loop since they take the reverse path of
Interests. Thus an CCN router can send out an Interest using multiple interfaces without worrying about loops. The first Data coming back will satisfy the Interest and be cached locally; later arriving copies will be discarded. This built-in multipath capability elegantly supports load balancing as well as service selection. For example, a router may forward the first few Interests out via all possible interfaces, measure the performance based on returning Data, and select the best performing interface(s) for subsequent Interests.
Strategies for the FIB tabulation
The other faces in a FIB prefix entry are learned in different ways. Sources of data, such it will be decremented to 0 and then only forwarded to local applications.
Mobility in CCN
Machines today typically have multiple network interfaces and are increasingly mobile.
Since IP is restricted to forwarding on spanning trees, it is difficult for IP to take advantage of more than one interface or adapt to the changes produced by rapid mobility. CCN packets cannot loop so CCN can take full advantage of multiple interfaces. CCN talks about data, not to nodes, so it does not need to obtain or bind a layer 3 identity (IP address) to a layer 2 identity such as a MAC address. Even when connectivity is rapidly changing, CCN can always exchange data as soon as it is physically possible to do so. They can be broadly classified as mobile ad hoc and infrastructure networks. In the mobile ad hoc networks there is no central entity to oversee the transactions between the mobile nodes. Nodes join and leave the network in a random fashion.
On the other hand, in the mobile-ad hoc networks, the central entity (generally the Access point) manages the interaction and movements of the mobile nodes. Mobile CCN networks are further discussed in the Chapter 5.
RELATED WORK

Interest Flooding Attacks (IFA)
Malicious/compromised users may exploit the PIT-based forwarding mechanism of NDN to launch the IFA, which is considered as one of the most serious types of DDoS attacks on NDN [7] . According to IFA, the malicious user (or a group of users) will issue a large number of bogus Interest packets. Each router, upon receiving each of these packets, will create an entry in its PIT and will forward the packet to the next-hop node (router or content source). According to the NDN rules, an entry is removed from the PIT when the entry has expired or the router received the corresponding Data packet before the entry expiration.
According to the above, the best attacking strategy is to issue Interest packets for nonexistent content. In this case, the bogus entries will stay in the PIT as much as possible. The goal of the attacker is to quickly fill in the PIT and to keep it full, so that the Interest packets originated from legitimate users will eventually be dropped.
For example, assume that the PIT capacity in each router is 3 entries. The attacker's strategy is to send 3 bogus Interest packets for (different) non-existent content. These packets will fill in the PITs of both routers. The source will drop these packets, since they request non-existent content. However, the corresponding entries will stay in the PITs until they expire. After the expiration, the attacker will issue 3 new Interest packets, aiming at keeping the PITs always full.
This way, some, or even all, Interest packets of legitimate users will be dropped. 
Undetected Interest Loops in CCN
The author in 
Attacks in Mobile CCN
Mobile node(s), controlled by an attacker, can exploit the shared link in CCN while creating Denial of Service effect. Two possible ways to do this are as follows:
(i) A mobile node can issue a large number of interests to ask for bulk data while not maintaining interests itself. Subsequently, data (content objects) will arrive at the local link without a receiver. A huge impact may be observed in such a case when there exists limited bandwidth in a mobile environment. A mobile attacker effectively jams a region using this technique;
(ii) A mobile node can issue a large number of interests to ask for bulk data while leaving the local link and traversing into neighboring regions using circular routes (the departure cannot easily be detected in a shared link environment). In this way, a mobile attacker continuously offloads its interest bundles and blocks the availability of network for legitimate users.
Jamming attack: A node on a shared link may issue a large number of content requests without maintaining the Interests at its own (losing interest). Content will then arrive at the local link without a receiver. This is particularly harmful in mobile environments of limited bandwidth.
A mobile attacker can jam a region by traversing shared radio links while requesting bulk data. The process of Forwarding Loop is described in three main stages at each network system: 
Forwarding Loops in Static CCN Networks
We assume the physical topology of the underlying closed-static network is Mesh type and that we have a Compromised Router (CR) or a rogue-router (both terms used interchangeably) which is actively listening or transmitting on two or more faces. CR assisted by an independent set of consumer and producers adjacent to the router (one-hop away). This set of compromised producers (CP) and consumers (CC) aid in creating the required malicious Interest and Content objects to be routed by the compromised router (CR). We have identified loops with one and two compromised routers, which can also be generalized to n-compromised nodes.
(A) Loop traversing one compromised router
Step 1: Identification of the Loop
The forwarding loop can either be identified by the CR independently or with the aid of another malicious consumer node, which is located in the same domain as that of the CR.
Figure 5. Forwarding Loop with one CR in Static CCN
In the first scenario, the CC sends out a fake Interest packet to the which in turn forwards it only on one of its outgoing faces. The specific face chosen can based on prior strategic analysis of the incoming interests on multiple interfaces of the routers, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the default case, as described in the previous sections, an Interest packet for unknown content is sent on all the broadcast capable faces (and later on the remaining faces). This fake interest packet is generated for a unique content name such that it can only be satisfied by the content object generated by the CP (or the inherent producer). The prefix of this unique content is purposefully not registered by the CR (can also be considered as the content being invoked/created for the Interest on the fly) in its CCN domain so as to trigger a broadcast flooding of the interest, in search of the satisfying content.
After a couple of iterations, the CR may receive the Interest back on one or more of its remaining faces, excluding the one it had previously sent the Interest out on. Figure 6 shows a simple scenario with a loop comprising of 6 nodes: CR  R1R2R3R4R5CR. This proves the existence of a loop, traversing the CR, in the CCN domain. We can also assume that the loop created by the Interest packet received last on one of the faces, is the longest or has the highest cost, among all the loops detected and either of these properties can be further exploited by the attacker.
In the second scenario, another malicious consumer node, located in the same domain as that of the CR sends out the interest for unique content name which only be satisfied by the content object generated by the CP. This Interest packet is flooded in the domain and may be received on one or more faces of the CR. If the interest is indeed received on two or more faces of the CR, we can safely assume the existence of the loop traversing the CR, which can be created and exploited as described below. The above scenario can also aid in the identification and creation of longer loops.
Step 2 Consider the following scenario with a compromised router. The initial adjacent node (R1 in Figure 6 ) to which the attacker had asked for content, will be unable to find any cached content for this unique Interest in the CS. There wouldn't be any similar pending interests in the PIT nor any entries for the prefix in the FIB. According to the current methods, the initial edge node, floods the Interest on all its faces and adds an entry in its PIT for the same. The interest propagates in the network along the core nodes, following the above flooding strategy, until it reaches the rouge router node (CR  R1R2R3R4R5CR ). The rouge router is the only one which can satisfy the specific interest, such that it may receive the same interest on multiple interfaces from adjacent nodes in the same network. This strategy aids in interpreting the "loops" to the starting node on which the Attacker had asked for an interest.
But the Rogue node instead of sending back the Content Object on all the interfaces on which the interest was received (CR  R5R4R3R2R1CR), it sends it only one particular face (of the so-formed loop). The CO is passed along all nodes on one singular path until it reaches the final node and forwarded to the Attacker. When the CO is received, the PIT entry for the unique interest is eliminated and an entry is added for that unique prefix in the FIBs (along with the ingress interface on which the CO was received) of all the nodes along that singular path.
The content may also be cached in the CS of the nodes along the path. The PIT entry for the unique interest for the all other adjacent nodes, on which the CO was not received, will expire and no entry is added to the FIB or CS.
Instead of creating fake Interest packets, the compromised producer can also anticipate popular content and is ready with the content, before any other node can provide it.
Step 3: Exploitation of the Loop
Now without the help of the attacker, the Rogue router may send another Interest with the same prefix along the reverse loop. Next rogue router can send the same Interest with same name but a different nonce and with an Interest lifetime more than specified before.
So according to the strategy, the previous entry's Lifetime is increased. The routers keep increasing the Interest Lifetime of the Interest in the PIT entry, and this is propagated throughout the loop and the whole operation is stalled. In this scenario the genuine Interests packets get dropped and the attacker may employ Bots to increase the miss rate.
CC may also send out other many more Interests packets (either requesting unique fake content or a huge file which has multiple segments). These fake interest entries can then overflow the PIT table, which will subsequently drop the legitimate Interest packets from legitimate users, having reached the hardware memory capacity, thus leading to Interest flood attacks. 
Forwarding Loops in Mobile CCN Networks
The forwarding loop attacks can be extended to the mobile CCN systems as discussed below. We assume the compromised node (CN) in the Ad Hoc networks has the feature of inherently creating both Interest and Content Objects, thus acting as the consumer, the producer (or publisher) and router independently.
In the below scenario (Fig.7a ) the forwarding loop in a simple ad-hoc network with a single compromised node is depicted. We observe that the CN acts as both the CC and the CP. The loop follows similar stages as previously discussed in the Static CCNs in the above section. The only difference being the inherent capability of the Ad Hoc nodes acting as the CR, CP and CC. 
Figure 7b. Forwarding Loop with two CRs in Ad hoc CCN
We can also extend it to the mobile CCN infrastructure (wireless or cellular) networks with the underlying hierarchical topology. We present two instances in this scenario as depicted in Fig.8a and 8b . In the first instance the mobile node is travelling through a single domain (Intradomain CCN system), where it could register as a Producer with one edge node (AP3) and strategically choose another nearby edge node (AP4) where it can act as a Consumer. In the identification phase of the loop, the mobile node could register its fake unique name space acting as a mobile Producer on edge node and then send an Interest packet for that unique content on another nearby edge node now acting as a mobile Consumer node. If the interest is received on the producer side, we could safely assume the existence of a loop. This could then be preceded by the establishment and exploitation phases of the loop as discussed earlier. 
Detection and Mitigation Techniques
In this section we discuss the possible detection and mitigation strategies of Forwarding Loops. The implementation and impact of these loops is studied in the Chapter 6.
Node ID/ Router ID fields
One of the main reasons for the creation of the forwarding loop is the retransmission of the 
Maximum Interest Life-time (MIL)
The Maximum Interest Life-time (MIL) assumed by a router before it deletes an Interest from its PIT should be large enough to preclude an excessive number of retransmissions. On the other hand, MIL should not be too large to cause the PITs to store too many Interests for which no NDO messages or NACKs will be sent due to failures or transmission errors. A few seconds would be a viable value for MIL. In practice, however, the consumer submitting an Interest to its local router could provide an initial value for the Interest lifetime estimated over a number of Interests submitted for NDOs in the same NDO group corresponding to a large piece of content (e.g., a movie). This is specially the case given our assumption that Interest retransmissions are carried out by content consumers, rather than by routers. Furthermore, because the CCN forwarding strategy does not detect loops when Interests are aggregated, many Interest entries in PITs may have to be stored until their lifetimes expire.
Suppression of Malicious Nodes
The methods of detecting and mitigating Interest Flood Attacks elaborated in [7] which are mainly focused on edge routers could be extended to the core routers in Static CCN systems to detect the compromised routers which generate exceedingly high traffic. The steps involved in the detection of the malicious node and its suppression is briefly stated in the following steps.
1) Attack detection:
During the detection phase, the edge router keeps statistics about the expired PIT entries per each user. Two thresholds are used to classify users into: legitimate, suspicious (possible attackers), and malicious (attackers). If the number of expired PIT entries per time unit, N of a user u is below the low threshold, T-low, user u is considered legitimate. If N is above T-low but below the high threshold, T-high, user u is considered suspicious. Finally, if N> T-high, user u is considered malicious.
2) Rate reduction and blocking phase:
During this phase, any user that has been classified as malicious, will be blocked, whereas the suspicious users will receive reduced data rate.
3) Attack notification phase:
If an edge router detects an ongoing attack, after blocking this user, it will notify other routers about the identity of the malicious user, by sending the attack notification packet. This is done to prevent the Mobile Interest Flooding Attack, where a mobile user periodically visits different routers and floods them with Interest packets. In this context, the notion of router is extended and refers to any data-forwarding network element, such as a Wi-Fi Access Point (AP) or a Base Station (BS) in a cellular network.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The fundamental departure of the CCN communication paradigm from the Internet Protocol principles requires extensive evaluation through experimentation, and simulation is an essential tool to enable the experimentation at scale. For this purpose, we rely on the open source simulation software ndnSIM.
We consider a fixed set of nodes in the network. In the first scenario we evaluate the packet dropping probability of the entire network, with respect to the length of the forwarding loop involving a single compromised router (Self-loop). We consider a mesh network in matrix representation of 5X5, with 24 ordinary routers and 1 compromised router. The CR, located at the center of one edge of the matrix, has both the CP and CC assisting it in administering the forwarding loop. We consider a simple scenario where we have 9 consumer nodes (C1-C9) and 9 producer nodes (P1=P9). Each of these consumer nodes sends Interests requesting content that can be satisfied by the corresponding Producer node (C1 for P1, C2 for P2 and so on). The producers listen on specific prefixes (we chose a random prefix: /producer*n*/ for each of the n-producers) previously announced in the network.
To show the negative impact of the forwarding loops, we evaluate the packet dropping probability of actual users (producers and consumers) due to PIT overflow. We consider the PIT capacity equal to 250 MB and PIT entry expiration time of 500ms. The rest of the simulation parameters remain the same as described in the previous paragraph. In the first scenario For each individual loop we calculate the packet dropping probability. R1  R2  CR  R3  R4   R5  R6  R7  R8  R9   R10  R11  R12  R13  R14   R15  R16  R17  R18  R19   R20  R21  R22  R23  R24   C1  C2  CC  C3  C4   C5   C6   C7   C8   C9   P1  P2  P10  0   P3  P4   P9   P8   P7   P6 P5
CP
The results are outlined in the graph (Fig 10) were we plot the rate of the packet dropping probability over time for the six individual loops. We observe that a large number of legitimate requests will not be satisfied, since the corresponding PIT entry of each request will expire before the content arrives. We can also observe that dropping probability increases with increase in the length of the loop. These results show that it is relatively easy even for attacking nodes of limited capabilities to quickly occupy large amounts of router's storage and processing resources.
Figure 10. Graph depicting the variation of Packet Dropping Probability with the Loop Lengths
In the second scenario we extend the above evaluation to assess and compare the situation with two and four compromised routers with the same underlying 5X5 matrix. In this scenario a fixed length loop of 15 (Hop-limit of 14) is considered. The rest of the simulation parameters remain the same as described in the previous scenario. In the first case we deploy two compromised R5  R6  R7  R8  R9   CR4  R11  R12  R13  CR4   R15  R16  R17  R18  R19   R20  R21  CR3  R23  R24   C1  C2   CC1   C3  C4   C5   C6   CC2   C8   C9   P1  P2  CP3  P3  P4   P9   P8   CP4   P6   P5   CP1   CC3   CC4  CP2  0 prevent the occurrence of the loop. We propose a blocking technique where we send an exclusive broadcast packet called 'Block' which is an Interest packet listing the namespaces that are to be blocked i.e. all the interest packets with those restricted namespaces are deemed to be malicious and should be dropped by the router. All the future Interest packets querying for content with the restricted namespace are dropped and the loop is eliminated. This technique is implemented in the second case with four compromised routers and the results are populated in Fig 12. We observe that the packet dropping probability is decreased with the blocking technique in the second case. The simulation can also be described with the bipartite graph G = (C ∪ P, E) where the vertex set is composed of two parts Consumer set C and Producer set P and every edge has one end point in C and the other in P. That is there is no edge with both its endpoints in C or P. The set R depicts the various combinations of the intermediate paths (of nodes) that can be traversed to reach from the consumer set to the producer set. A simple case of this implementation is depicted in Fig 13 . Occurrence of these attacks in other novel networking protocols can be further explored in the future.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have described how malicious customers can attack the availability of Content Centric Networks (CCNs) by creating forwarding loops inside one CCN cluster or across multiple Clusters. We have discussed how the forwarding loops cause one request to be processed repeatedly or even indefinitely, resulting in undesired resource consumption and potential Denialof-Service attacks. We have discussed the phases of these loop attacks in Static CCN systems and extended it to the mobile CCN systems. Next, we proposed a few detection and mitigation techniques that will allow routers to identify and prevent the formation of such loops. Finally, to evaluate the practicality of such forwarding-loop attacks, we used ndnSIM to simulate these loops in various scenarios discussed earlier.
We have observed that the Forwarding loops have a considerable impact on the normal services provided by the CCN. Future work could focus on more efficient proposals for the detection and mitigation strategies of these loops. Forwarding loop attacks can also be evaluated further in other scenarios of ICN in the future.
